January 2026

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry second report landed just before Christmas — 800 pages on how government failed to act quickly enough, coordinate across departments, or heed scientific advice. Its headline verdict is perhaps unsurprisingly ‘too little, too late.’ But buried in the detail is something that should concern anyone working on food system transformation: a damning account of why cross-government action on complex problems is so hard to deliver.

Here’s what the Inquiry reveals about the machinery of government, and why it matters for food.

Quick Take:

• The UK Covid-19 Inquiry exposes deep flaws in how government handles complex, cross-cutting challenges. Ministers delayed action, cherry-picked scientific advice, and failed to coordinate sufficiently well across Westminster and the devolved governments. The Inquiry calls it a ‘too little, too late’ response that may have cost 23,000 lives.

• Cross-government working is ‘200% harder’. That’s the blunt assessment from Henry de Zoete, former No10 advisor, on why policies requiring multiple departments to act face near-impossible odds. This is a problem baked in from the start for food policy: responsibility spans Defra, DHSC, Treasury and others, but no single department owns it.

• The current PM confirms the problem persists. In December, Starmer told Parliament his experience as Prime Minister ‘is of frustration’ – that pulling any lever leads to ‘a whole bunch of regulations, consultations, arms-length bodies’ slowing delivery. This despite a 160-seat majority.

• This should worry anyone banking on joined-up food policy. The National Food Strategy is based on cross-government coordination. The 10-Year Health Plan depends on Defra and DHSC working in lockstep. The Inquiry is a reminder that these aspirations run against the grain of how Whitehall actually operates.

Deep Dive:

What the Inquiry found

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s second report is an excoriating 800 pages on how the UK — both Westminster and the devolved administrations — responded to the pandemic.

The headline conclusion is that the British Government’s response was ‘too little, too late’. The Inquiry points to a culture at the heart of government that assumed the population would lose patience and not comply with public health rules, causing ministers to hold off on locking down. A lockdown one week earlier in spring 2020 could have led to 23,000 fewer deaths. Responding to the report, Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice UK described the behaviour of the then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, as ‘one of the gravest betrayals of the British public in modern history’.

The report reveals other seemingly pathological shortcomings in how government works. There was cherry-picking of scientific advice and an undue faith in British exceptionalism that led politicians to pay insufficient regard to how the pandemic was unfolding in other countries. A ‘constitutional fuzziness’ left relations between Westminster and the devolved governments uncertain, especially around whether to act together or independently.

Although the media’s news agenda has moved on, the Inquiry stands as a thoroughly researched testament to the problems of government under pressure, and how quickly coordination breaks down when complex, cross-cutting action is required.

Why it’s not just a Covid problem

The Inquiry’s findings might be dismissed as a product of unique circumstances — a once-in-a-century pandemic, an unusually chaotic administration. But there’s growing evidence that the dysfunction it describes is structural.

In December, Keir Starmer was asked by Parliament’s Liaison Committee what he’d found most difficult about delivering the ‘Plan for Change’. His reply was strikingly candid:

‘Speed and ability to get things done in Parliament…My experience as Prime Minister is of frustration that every time I go to pull a lever, there are a whole bunch of regulations, consultations and arm’s length bodies that mean the action from pulling the lever to delivery is longer than I think it ought to be.’

This from a government that won a large majority of over 160 in 2024. As Starmer put it, the more ambitious the reform, the greater the ‘thicket’ of reasons ‘you can’t do anything’.

Henry de Zoete, who served as Prime Minister Sunak’s advisor on AI in No10 from 2023 to 2024, offers an insider’s explanation. Among his advice for government advisers was this: ‘do as little as possible cross government’. He explained:

‘The division of government into 20-odd departments is somewhat arbitrary. That means that there is always an argument that a given policy would better be delivered through multiple departments. It can sound alluringly grown up to launch a cross-departmental, cross-cutting policy initiative. But you and your Minister have limited time, and any action requiring other departments to do stuff is 200% harder.’

The lesson is blunt: unless a cross-government initiative has sustained personal backing from the Prime Minister, it faces near-impossible odds.

What it means for food systems work

There is broad consensus on what needs to change in the UK food system. From Henry Dimbleby’s National Food Strategy to Tim Lang’s work on civil food resilience for the National Preparedness Commission, to our own AFN Roadmap for Resilience, the main areas are well mapped: climate adaptation, agricultural productivity, dietary health, biodiversity, and land use. The diagnosis is not the problem.

The harder question is whether government can deliver the cross-cutting action these challenges demand. Food policy sits across Defra, DHSC, Treasury, and others. It touches farming, public health, trade, planning, and education. It is, almost by definition, the kind of ‘alluringly grown up’ cross-departmental initiative that de Zoete warns against.

The Covid-19 Inquiry doesn’t mention food. But for anyone developing the evidence base for food system transformation, or proposing policy measures to deliver it, the report is essential context. It is a reminder that the political and administrative terrain is difficult and that ambition alone, however well-evidenced, will not be enough.

This isn’t cause for despair. But it does suggest that advocates for food system change need to be realistic about the machinery they’re working with. Building alliances, sustaining pressure, and finding ways to make cross-departmental coordination unavoidable rather than optional may matter as much as getting the policy detail right.

What now?

The Covid-19 Inquiry may have slipped from the headlines, but its lessons haven’t gone away. If you’ve seen what works — or what doesn’t — when it comes to making cross-departmental food policy happen, we’d like to hear from you. Get in touch.